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Crits and Cricket: A Deconstructive Spin
(Or Was It a Googly?)
Allan C. Hutchinson
Osgoode Hall Law School

"Do you know who made you?" "Nobody,
as I knows on," said the child, with a
short laugh . . . "I 'spect J grow' d."
Harriet Beecher Stowe, Uncle Tom's Cabin
Something ofa precocious "child," critical legal studies (CLS) is already in its teenage years.
Jn its short, but hectic life, it has already made a significant contribution to modern legal
thought and practice. Measured quantitatively, its presence is strong and incontestable: there
are around 800 articles and books that can loosely be grouped under the rubric of CLS. Its
qualitative impact is more controversial: its intellectual reception runs from enthusiastic
acceptance to vehement rejection. Indeed, the intensity and heat generated by CLS writers,
both collectively and individually, testify to its growing significance in jurisprudential debate
and practice. Many have chastised CLS for its irreverence and a few have gone so far as to
demand its ejection from the law schools.I Yet most would agree that CLS is the most
challenging and exciting genre of legal criticism to force its way onto the jurisprudential
scene for many a decade.

· Now facing the awkward rites of adolescent passage - a certain crisis of identity, a
keener appreciation of race and gender differences, and a relative loss of social innocencethe time is ripe to take stock of CLS's development and its relevance to Canadian
jurisprudence.2 It must be said that CLS is an American phenomenon. Its very shape and life
history can be fully comprehended only in terms of the history and practice of the concrete
circumstances of the American legal, academic, and political establishments. The most
pertinent factors include the lack of any sizeable left tradition in popular politics; the isolation
and victimization of left intellectuals in the universities; the male monopoly on legal and
political power; the legacy ofinstitutional racism; the thoroughly professional orientation of
legal education; and the centrality of the Supreme Court in the constitutional scheme and
national psyche. Nevertheless, its methodological insights, suitably muted, are pertinent to
the Canadian context. The objective of this essay is to explain the nature and aspirations of
CLS 's central ideas and ambitions. After a brief glimpse at the origins of CLS and its general
orientation, I will explicate the substance and aspirations of the "law is politics" claim. In
order to substantiate this discussion, I will offer a typically deconstructive-style CLS reading
of a case and end by emphasizing the democratic possibilities of such an approach.
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I

Over the past decade, CLS has mounted a major offensive on the whole edifice of modem
jurisprudence. The fight is over the meaning and enforcement of "the entrenched clauses of
the constitution of the republic of [legal] knowledge."3 Put crudely, the central thrust of
CLS 's attack has been to continue and go beyond the realist project by allying it to a program
ofleft politics. Many CLS conclusions are far from novel or surprising, but they do comprise

the most sustained and serious attempt by left lawyers to expose the political dimensions of
the adjudicative and legal process. Not sjmply an intellectual tendency, it exists as a
membership organization. Many of the founding CLS members were students during the
civil rights movement and the anti-Vietnam campaign of the 1960s. As such, CLS recognizes
these activist roots as the energy source of much of its theoretical endeavour - there is
nothing so practical as a good theory. Practical commitment and group solidarity remain
crucial values in the CLS ethos. In the early 1970s, the closest place to a haven for legal
radicals was the Law and Society Association. But there was already disenchantment with
its "empirico-behaviourist" alignment.4 After some discussion, CLS was officially born in
the spring of 1977 at a conference at the University ofWisconsin at Madison. Its membership
includes law teachers, lawyers, social theorists, and law students. As well as being an
intellectual focus and clearinghouse for left writers, it represents a collaborative network to
support and reinforce the professional activities of like-minded people.
There are many different strands to CLS and its members run from the disaffected liberal,
through the radical feminist, to the utopian anarchist. Much of its organizational strength and
intellectual integrity reside in this diversity and eclecticism. But they unify in their common
opposition to the intellectual and political dominance of the liberal establishment. Although
liberalism once contributed to the improvement of the social lot, it has now outlived its
usefulness and has become a dangerous political anachronism. Offended by the hierarchical
structures of domination that characterize modem society, CLS people work toward a just
world that is more democratic and egalitarian. They do not wish to embroider further the
patchwork quilt of liberal politics, but strive to cast it aside and reveal the vested interests that
thrive under its snug cover. Their ambition is to make a bigger social bed with more popular
bedding. Not surprisingly, CLS 's particular contribution to this social struggle has concentrated
on the leading part that law has played in maintaining the status quo and stymieing efforts at
fundamental change.
A ·c ommon question is whether CLS is realism rewarmed or realism rejected.5 It is both
and neither. As CLS views it, in the 1920s and 1930s, realism toppled the regnant formalism
not as a prelude to overthrowing liberalism, but as a way of making good on the liberal
promise. Realism's attacks were never intended to be more than a palace revolution.6 The
realists were ideologically and practically wedded to the reform program of New Deal
liberalism. They effected prag~atic shift of institutional focus rather than a thoroughgoing
rejection of liberal politics: they wanted to replace judge-dominated legal science with
bureaucracy-wielded policy science. Indeed, the fact that most lawyers today can claim, with
considerable credibility, that "we are all realists now"7 says much about the traditional view
of realism. In contrast, CLS has redoubled the realist assault on formalism and extended it .
to political as well as legal claims of scientific rationality: Like the neo-formalists, such as
Hart and Sacks, that followed them, the realists smothered the truly radical insights and
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implications of its critique. CLS has salvaged these powerful insights and insisted that no
objectively correct results exist, regardless of whether they are presented in terms of legal
doctrine or policy analysis and no matter how skilled the advocate or judge is. For CLS, the
taking of political sides is inescapable.
Although CLS offers a thoroughgoing and ideological critique of law and liberalism, it
has not stepped back into the welcoming arms of orthodox Marxism. CLS has no truck with
the belief that there is a direct causal and substantive nexus between material conditions and
the legal superstructure. It denies the possibility of discovering intelligible and settled laws
of historical/social/economic/etc., change. While recognizing that law often does act as a
weapon and shield for the "capitalistic" organization of society, CLS argues that law
functions as much as a legitimating force as a deterministic instrument. Law and society are
not separate spheres, but are mutually constitutive and they interpenetrate. In this sense, CLS
builds on the more critical part of the Marxist canon. 8 Like liberalism, Marxism glimpsed the
corrosive power of social relativity and historical contingency, but suffered a final lack of
nerve in completing the modem rebellion against the view that there is any natural or
inevitable form of social organization. CLS has refused to shrink back from the subversive
implications of this imperative.
For CLS, critique must begin and proceed with the operation of law as ideology. This
is not to trivialize the coercive functioning of much law, but to supplement and strengthen
the radical critique. For CLS, the rule of law is a mask that lends to existing social structures
the appearance oflegitimacy and inevitability; it transfonns the contingency of social history
into a fixed set ofstructural arrangements and ideological commitments. CLS •s demonstration
that the status quo and its intellectual footings, far from being built on the hard rock of
historical necessity, are actually sited on the shifting sands of social contingency, is both
critical and constructive. Not only does it expose the illusory and fraudulent claims of
traditional writers, but it also clears the ground for different and transformative ways of
thinking about law and society. In a world in which law plays such an important role, the need
to understand the historicity and ideology of the lawyer's way of thinking about, and acting
in, the world is so important. From abstract theory to thick descriptions oflegal doctrine, CLS
writers have explored the intimate relation between law and the routine practices of social

life.9
In mounting its uncompromising offensive on law and legal theory, CLS has operated
on two major and mutually supportive fronts. Although they function in harness, they can be
treated separately for the purposes of explication as operating "internally" and "externally."
The internal critique takes seriously conventional writing, both scholarly and judicial. CLS
engages jurists and judges on their own turf and shows how they fail to live up to their vaunted
standards of rationality and coherence: they cannot withstand the debilitating force of their
own critical apparatus. The main target of CLS has been the crucial distinction between law
and politics; or, to be more precise, the alleged contrast between the open ideological nature
of political debate and the bounded objectivity oflegal reasoning. CLS rejects this axiomatic
premise of traditional lawyering. Beneath the patina of legalistic jargon, law and judicial
decision making are neither separate nor separable from disputes about the kind of world we
want to live in. Legal reasoning consists of an endless and contradictory process of making,
refining, reworking, collapsing, and rejecting doctrinal categories and distinctions. Doctrinal
patterns can never be objectively justified and consist of a haphazard cluster of ad hoc and
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fragile compromises. Legal doctrine is a small and unrepresentative sample of conflictual
problems and their contingent solution.
The esoteric and convoluted nature· of legal doctrine is an accommodating screen to
obscure its indeterminacy and the inescapable element of judicial choice. In the cold light of
CLS day, traditional lawyering is reduced to a clumsy and repetitive series of bootstrap
arguments and legal discourse becomes merely a stylized version of political discourse. Yet,
and most important, this revelation of indeterminacy is not tantamount to a dismissal oflegal
doctrine as incoherent or unintelligible. Its purpose is to clarify rather than to cloud our
understanding of doctrinal operations. Nor is it tantamount to a suggestion that doctrinal
development is autonomous from the status quo-oriented prejudices of ideological debate,
for there exists doctrinal indeterminacy with an ideological slant. The judicial emperor,
clothed and coiffured in appropriately legitimate and voguish garb by the scholarly rag trade,
chooses and acts to protect and preserve the propertied interest of vested white, male, and
monied power.
The CLS claims of indeterminacy and contradiction do not simply go to legal doctrine
and theorizing, they go to the very heartofliberal democratic politics. Doctrinal indeterminacy
is a localized illustration of the bankruptcy of liberal theory and practice. The ailing corpus
of black-letter legal theory cannot be made good by injecting a dose of black-letter political
theory. Liberalism embraces a host of dualities, such as objective/subjective, male/female,
public/private, self/other, individual/community, or whatever, as devices for providing a
plausible description of the world and a convenient prescription for action. As in the legal
sphere, political debate is open-ended and unclosable. It exhausts itself in an agonized
struggle for the very elusive Archimedean point outside history and society from which to
mediate the dualities and sustain a position of normative equilibrium. Liberalism is pervaded
by contradictory principles with no metatbeory to reconcile them. Political decisions and
social arrangements can never be objectively justified and amount to contingent choices. But,
while they are arbitrary in a theoretical sense, these decisions are not arbitrary in a practical
sense, because they follow the general pattern of established interests.
Although most CLS work is seen to work along the "internal" front, it draws much of
its theoretical purpose from the simultaneous campaign being waged on the "external" front.
While the intemal critique is powerful and productive, its success is necessarily limited. A
demonstration of rational incoherence and internal contradiction is only fatal within a liberal
tradition of rationalist epistemology.10 This concession far from trivializes the internal
critique, because the established and irrepressible presence of incoherence and contradiction
delegitimates and demystifies the authority of law in constructing and maintaining social
reality. To be fully convincing and successful, the whole liberal tradition of rationalist
epistemology must be discredited and dismantled. This is exactly what the "external" critique
of CLS takes aim at. CLS does not simply contest the practical policies yielded by traditional
legal theorizing, it rejectS the very basis of contemporary legal theorizing. As in the
celebrated dispute between Galileo and the Italian establishment, it is not merely the truth of
nature that is at stake, but the nature of truth itself. CLS seeks to reformulate the ground rules
by revising the epistemological and political criteria for valid legal theory. Drawing on the
work of radical philosophers and social theorists, CLS is attempting to provide a fresh
touchstone for distinguishing good knowledge from bad. Although traditional scholars pride
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themselves on being engaged in "a continuing dialogue with reality,"11 CLS rejects the
structure of that dialogue and the substance of that reality.
Despite its pluralist protestations, mainstream lawyering and legal thought remains in
thrall to an ideal of legal/political rationality. CLS writers have ruthlessly attacked this
"foundational" thinking. There is no privileged ground for legal/political argument to stand
or build on. Doctrinal understanding is more a matter of professional familiarity and political
partiality than moral insight and technical correctness. Legal/politjcal rationality is no Jess
constructed than the courts of law themselves. For CLS, there is no position of theoretical
innocence or political neutrality. Any act of interpretation or judgment has indissociable
political and historical dimensions. The question of what amounts to valid knowledge is itself
a socio-political matter. Legal epistemology is ideological warfare fought by other, more
esoteric means.

II
Despite common understandings about the political character of law, there remains a core
belief that law retains an essential degree of autonomy. Legal interpretation can, and should,
be performed in a way that distinguishes it from the more open-ended, ideological debates
that are the stuff of political struggle. Borne and practised in politics, the idea is that law
somehow manages to retain a distinct accent and idiom that speaks to politics, but is not
entirely spoken for by that politics. As law is not optional and can be coercively imposed, the
independence and impartiality of lawyers and judges is paramount. "[Their] authority and
immunity depend upon the assumption that [they] speak with the mouth of others."12 Legal
reasoning is something more than simply what lawyers happen to say. If it was only that, it
would warrant no greater (norlesser) respect and deference than what ideologues, steelworkers,
and accountants say or sing.
To provide a convincing justification of the crucial distinction between law and lawyers,
it must be shown that the doctrinal materials that comprise the law cannot offer determinate
guidance in the resolution of most legal cases. In a political and legal system that claims to
be democratic, such impersonal constraints on the important activities ofunelected officials
is vital to that system's continued legitimacy and appeal. This need is particularly acute in
the area of constitutional adjudication. In other words, I will argue that legal interpretation
is thoroughly political because its performance and product can never be detached from the
identities and interests of the interpreters. In short, the prestige and authority of lawyers is
unfounded in political practice and unfoundable in political theory.
Doctrinal analysis remains the primary work of the law student, professor, practitioner,
and judge. The task of the lawyer is portrayed as similar to that of the warehouseperson. Law
comprises a great storehouse of rules, principles, and similar normative goods that have been
individually catalogued and systematically shelved. During the course of business, goods
shift in and out of the warehouse in response to the quantity and quality of legal trade. Apart
from keeping the detailed inventory, doctrinal analysts have to ensure that incoming norms
are screened and sorted so that the e{Cisting stock is not contaminated by unsuitable or errant
goods. At any time, however, experienced scholars can point to a principle or set of rules that
is appropriate to revolve a particular litigate dispute. Also, they will be able to perform a
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thorough stock-taking and present a workable account of the totality of normative goods
housed. An exhaustive survey is precluded by the open-ended character of such goods, and
the brisk nature of legal trade. Doctrinal analysts do not consider the elucidation of an
underlying prescriptive theme or grander nonnative unity to be part of their job description.
They feel that they have ample work cutout for themselves in conquering the technical details
in their own chosen alcove of the doctrinal warehouse. Doctrinal analysts accept that
economics or philosophy might be valuable to a broader understanding of their warehousing
craft, they simply do not think that it is their responsibility to pursue such inquiries.
Under this traditional division of jurisprudential labour, such a pursuit falls squarely
within the duties oflegal theorists- that is, to provide the larger and more integrative view
of law, to evaluate its performance, and to fathom its relation to other disciplines. This
contemporary project has taken many diverse shapes and sizes. Some have turned to the
humanities for inspiration and found recent writings (of Rawls, Nozick, Hayek, or ... ) in
political and moral philosophy to be precisely what the jurisprudential doctor ordered. Others
have preferred the social sciences and find intellectual succour in the models of the
economists or sociologists. Still others have resorted to the study of language itself and taken
comfort in its hermeneutic possibilities. Yet, in raiding these other disciplines, legal theorists
have maintained an often neglected, but shared informing ambition. They have sought to
supplement the doctrinal analysts' understanding of the Jaw by revealing the inherent
rationality or normative underpinnings of the law.13
This replacement of black-letter law with black-letter theory should not come as a
surprise. Contemporary legal theory is a more sophisticated continuation of the traditional
search for Coke's "artificial reason and judgment oflaw ."14 Straining the truly radical insights
and implications of the realist critique through a traditional sieve, contemporary scholars
have served up a thin gruel of neo-forrnalism. Interdisciplinary study is not necessarily more
liberating nor less narrowing. The shift from ratio decidendi to Pareto optimality or Kantian
normativity is of dubious merit. The role of interdisciplinary study is not to supplant legal
reasoning nor to provide a substitute for legal wisdom, but to locate and understand them
better. In delving into the foreign fields of other scholarly disciplines, the hope remains
constant. There is no desire to open up the legal project to the subversive messages of some
of those toiling in the anthropological or sociological soil of radical study. The objective of
this extra-legal adventure is to complete the traditional program of legal theory, not to
undermine its validity or success.
The force of this commitment to understanding law and its study as autonomous is
revealed in the literature on adjudication. The primary and self-imposed task oflegal theorists
is to explain and suggest how judges can make the law responsive to changing social demands
and, at the same time, retain democratic legitimacy. Jn other words, how can judges engage
in politics in a distinctly "legal" way? The realization that, without an organizing and
informing political vision, legal reasoning is reduced to a desultory game of catch-as-catchcan and is part of the received conventional wisdom. Legal theorists recognize that the larger
questions of political justice must be addressed by any serious account oflegal development
and that adjudication is quintessentially political in perfo1mance and product.
Without a workable and convincing separation of law and politics, therefore, the
legitimacy and prestige of courts and legal doctrine is undermined. However, in defending
this crucial distinction, it is important to understand what claims are and are not being made;
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the nature of the distinction and its modem articulation are of a very particular kind.15 All
lawyers concede that legal activity, whether it pertains to legislation, litigation or law
enforcement, arises in broadly political circumstances and that it will have some political
consequences. Notwithstanding this, the law- and politics-problematic assume that there can
exist a way of thinking about law and politics as independent and separable entities that is both
possible and desirable. It must not only satisfy the constraints of immanent or transcendent
rationality, but must meet the demands of political justice. While I do not think that such an
achievement is attainable, it suffices to say that that immaculate position has not been attained
to date. Theidea that the many different judges in many different places might all be operating
unknowingly under the influence of one-"invisible hand" or "mind ," stretches the bounds of
credulity to breaking point. The idea that this unifying mentality is not only just, but happens
to be the same as the theorists making this discovery, is surely too much even for the most
faithful among the academic establishment. Consequently, although our existence in the law
school and the legal community at large may demand a focus on matters legal, it does not
follow that law and lawyering must be treated as a distinct way of thinking and acting.
Because legal theorists deal with what lawyers do, it does not mean that they have to elevate
it to a privileged category of human activity with a special epistemological and ontological
status. Although federal parliamentarians are not provincial representatives, it does not
follow from this fact that their basic identity as politicians is different in any normative or
critical sense.
At a general level, law and politics interact and interpenetrate in manifold and mutually
generative ways. Law is not only a political artifact of the first-order, it is also a primary
artisan of its political context. Legal interpretation is a thoroughly political phenomenon and
activity. The life of the law is more than logic and less than our total experience. Of course,
it does not mean that, because law and politics are fully implicated in one another, they
replicate each other in a simple or undistorted fashion. There is no form of social life "out
there" independent of the law that constitutes and structures it. Nor is there any law "out
there" independent of the society that generates and defines itself though that law .16
It is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to describe a state of affairs without drawing
on the lexical imagery of legal relations. As a white man, father, husband, worker, property
owner, etc., my life is saturated with and organized around different legal ideas. While law
works to impoverish the richness of my life by reducing it only to legal relations, it does play
a significant role in formulating my own self-image and patterns of behaviour. The act of
representing the wor:ld to which law applies is already thoroughly informed and constituted
by the forms ~nd structure oflegal thinking. Law does not function as an independent variable
in a complex social equation, but amounts to some of the very fibers and sinews of social life.
It is not possible to think or act as a lawyer without taking a political stand or having a vision,
no matter how unconscious or crude, of the collective and individual possibilities for human
development.
The whole practical operation of the law is illustrative of how lawyers (and laypeople)
treat the law's conceptual apparatus and discursive categories as natural and how, in the
process, they confer the status of the real and concrete on the abstract and metaphorical. For
instance, when deciding whether a contract exists between two parties, lawyers speak and act
as if they were looking for a "contractual" thing in a drawer full of social events and
circumstances. It is assumed that, if all the facts were known, " the contract" would somehow
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body forth and bring the dispute to a demonstrable close. Yet, as all Jaw students know, a
contract is an idea, not a thing; it is an abstract construction in a socio-historical context. It
exists in the realm of metaphysics, not in the world of physicality; a written contract is not
the contract, but simply evidence of the contract.
Similarly, property does not comprise the tangible objects in the physical world, but the
abstract relation between such visible effects and people.17 Although born of historical
expediency and sustained by political convenience, legal categories, like contract and
property, take on a life of their own and begin to paralyze the lawyers' imagination. Unlike
the life of the so-called natural world, social activity responds to these conceptual metaphors
and reproduces itself in accordance with them. The life of Jaw and lawyers is not unaffected
by prevailing ideas about what life should or ought to be. Not only does this give the law a
patina of plausibility and coherence, it allows lawyers to refer to "reality" as confirmation of
the naturalness and inevitability of prevailiing legal structures and their underlying values.
The fact that this process occurs unconsciously makes it no less political and much more
effective. Defmitions of law and its component parts are not referential facts, but political
claims and ideological appropriations.18

III
Under the rubric "law is politics," the critics take a very different view of the epistemological
status and methodological validity of law's claim to determinacy. Legal doctrine does not
conform to any simple internal rationality nor is it reducible to a cluster of external organizing
principles. While there is clearly an inseparable and organic relation between law and
politics, there is no one account of that relation that is valid for all time and all societies.
Indeed, any explanation is itself indeterminate because its character and implications vary
with the context.19 While they offer opinion and evaluation, they do not make claims about
whether doctrinal materials necessarily and universally determine results nor whether those
results are necessarily and universally good or bad. Crits are decidedly against any kind of
functionalist or instrumentalist account of tthe relation between law and politics, whether it
comes from the right, left, or centre of the political spectrum. Law is " neither a ruling-class
game plan nor a repository of noble if perverted principles ... [but] a plastic medium of
discourse that subtly conditions how we experience social life."20
With imagination and industry, legal materials can be organized to support and justify
incompatible outcomes. The fact that the general drift of these outcomes corresponds to the
orientation of status quo thinking and values is not necessary; it is not a matter of doctrinal
rationality, but a question ofpolitical orientation. The socio-economic context is itselflargely
indeterminate and requires no particular rule for its continued survival, while a shift in the
whole regime of legal rules (for example, the postal acceptance rule and the finders' rules)
will not be crucial. Moreover, in the same way that the socio-economic contextunderdeterrnines
law, that very same law overdetermines the possible outcomes to any legal dispute. There is
a general and pervasive indeterminacy that plagues all attempts, not simply j urisprudential
ones, to explain social events and to fix social knowledge.
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Even where there appears to be a consensus on the existence of any particular rule,
nothing necessarily flows from that concession. Whether a rule exists, and what it means, are
different enquiries. While they are not entirely unrelated, the issues give rise to a different set
of conceptual and normative concerns. For example, a person's ability to identify the French
language is of little help in determining what any particular example of it means. Rules do
not operate as impersonal and dispositive forces in social conflicts. Their existence and
meaning are more often the consequences, rather than the causes, of a particular resolution.
Furthermore, even if there is a consensus on the meaning and existence of a particular rule,
there is always another rule that competes for application; or, the dispute can be reclassified
to another doctrinal field, for instance, from tort to property or contract.21 Indeterminacy
infiltrates all levels and dimensions of the law; it energizes and debilitates the interpretive
process and search for meaning.
The effort to identify one definitive and normative explanation of that regime is defeated
by the fact that a theory will not be able to achieve the appropriate mix of analytical generality
and historical particularity. It will run the risk of overinclusion or underinclusion. A theory
that merely describes the extant details oflegal practice will not be able to predict the direction
and nature of doctrinal change. It will cease to be useful at the very time its assistance is most
required - the identification and resolution of hard cases. On the other hand, a theory that
attempts to move beyond such detailed description will run into two major obstacles. It will
be unable to account for a sufficient range of present legal data and lose its descriptive power.
Alternatively, it will be compatible with various combinations of legal materials that
comprise existing legal doctrine and fail to deliver on its predictive promise.
Contrary to the traditional view, the law is a locus ofconflict. There are a host ofdifferent
interpretations competing for descriptive and predictive superiority, but none is able to claim
final victory. Insofar as uncontested interpretation is only possible where there is a
preexisting and shared set of values, the competing and contradictory forces at work in
forging legal doctrine foreclose the establishment of the necessary consensus. Accordingly,
legal doctrine is not a reflected embodiment of one indwelling and sufficient theory, but is
the fonnal site for the attempted, but unattainable blending and reconciliation of competing
theories. The temporary accommodations made are more a result of political expediency than
moral purity. Although one theory may tend to dominate and infuse the law with its guiding
principles, a competing theory will constantly challenge it and provide a debilitating set of
counter principles. At times, the tension will precipitate doctrinal crisis, while at other times,
the friction will be subdued and relatively untroubling. Yet, muted or manifest, it fuels and
informs doctrinal development. The particular trajectory charted and followed will, at least
in part, be a function of the larger historical forces that impinge on the legal and judicial
enterprise.22 Consequently, in this general sense, law is another arena for the stylized struggle
over the terms and conditions of social life. In sum, law is politics.
As the critical position has gained intellectual ground, a number of misunderstandings
have drifted (or been pushed) into popular circulation. The most persistent and pervasive of
these hold that critics contend that law does not matter, that all cases can be decided either
way, that j udges act out of purely subjective preference, and that lawyers consciously
manipulate doctrine. Although these misapprehensions are attributable to a whole range of
prestigious sources, they are nicely brought together in a short article by Alvin Rubin.23 By
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confronting them, the claim that "law is politics" can be clarified further and the charge that
.. the law is indeterminate can be strengthened.
A common opinion is that the critics are devoted to the view that "doctrjne is nothing."24
It is supposed that they maintain that legal doctrine is so fundamentally indeterminate that
it possesses any meaning at all and has no magnetic pull on the resolution of particular
disputes. Each case is imagined to be scribbled on a clean slate and can be decided in a variety
of incompatible ways. This version of the non-autonomist position is a reductio ad absurdum.
It exaggerates the consequences of a rigorous skepticism, ignores the historical point of the
critical inquiry, and takes the political edge off the critique. It is definitely not the nonautonomists' case that there can be no general consensus on the shape and substance of past
doctrine nor that the resolution of particular cases cannot be confidently predicted. To ignore
such facts is to counsel a dangerous other-worldliness. But it is the case that law fails to meet
its own proclaimed standards of rational justification and cognitive clarity. Law is indeterminate, but it is not arbitrary nor entirely unpredictable. Unsupplemented by external
influences and values, legal doctrine can never, of itself, determine the "correct" and
I "unique" answer to a particular dispute. Any fragi le consensus about meaning or any
'I confidence in prediction does not arise from within doctrine, but is given to doctrine from
without.
Legal doctrine is not simply "out there," but is always in need of collective retrieval and
re-creation. The past is unknowable in and of itself. The past has passed and was what it was,
but it is up to those who follow to decide what it will become: the future of the past is a present
and continuing responsibility. Tangled in a skein of fact and fancy, history can never be
excavated in its pristine immediacy, but can only be experienced secondhand. Consequently,
meaning is always provisional, in that it is always open to (re )interpretation, and conditional,
in that it is only knowable from an interpretive perspective. Legal reality is the historical
function of the ideological commitments that comprise a legal community at any given time,
a community whose identity and expression is itself an interpretive artifact that is never "selfpresent as a positive fact.''25 There does not exist a necessary and adequate connection
between legal outcomes and doctrinal materials.
None of this is intended to deny the shared sense ofdoctrinal intelligibility that everyone
experiences at some time. Indeed, in the theoretical interrogation of"sharedmeaning," there
is an implicit and unavoidable reliance on the practice of shared meaning.26 What it is intended to do is to show that there can be no law without interpretation, no interpretation
without judges, and no judges without politics. The crux of the matter is not the existence of
institutional meaning and general predictability, but the source and authority of the normative
reading offered or supposed. On what basis can one reading be privileged over another? Legal
doctrine need not be as it is; it always contains the resources for its own reinterpretation and
revision. Doctrinal cons~stency and regularity are not attributable to law, but to the politics
of lawyers. While every case could be decided doctrinally in contradictory ways, the
relatively homogeneous values oflawyers and judges ensure that some results will be much
more likely than others. Law's reconstmctive potential can never be squeezed out by its
present actuality; closure of doctrinal openness is only bought at the price of intellectual selfdelusion and philosophical puzzlement. Accordingly, the critical truth is that doctrine is not
nothing, but a special kind of something. It means nothing until it is interpreted and, although
it will always have meaning, its meaning will be determined by those who interpret it.
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f?') A second misunderstanding, which flows from the first, is that, if there is any validity
"lothe critics' claims, it only has any force in cases "which are unusual, indeed exceptional."27
This argument relies on the familiar distinction between easy and hard cases. Whereas the
vast majority of cases will be straightforward and capable of disposition through the
uncontroversial application of precedent, a small minority of cases will raise novel or
contested issues and require a more creative approach that goes beyond precedent. There
remains disagreement within the traditional ranks as to what extent judges in hard cases are
constrained by doctrine in its larger sense.28
The easy/hard case distinction is more of a deferral of the autonomy issue than a
definitive resolution of it. The difficulty centres on the method by which such a distinction
is to be made and that method's origin and normative status. In order to maintain intellectual
credibility, the distinction must be defensible in terms of its necessary and internal legal
pedigree and not as the creature of contingent and external political considerations. To do
otherwise would be to recognize that law is driven by politics and, as such, to deny the
autonomy of law from politics. And this is exactly what reliance on the easy/hard case
distinction does. Moreover, this manoeuvre points up a more general infirmity in the attempt
to defend a law-politics separation. If law is valued because it is separable from politics, it
can only be because it is politically desirable to effect such a separation. The autonomy oflaw
cannot be intrinsically valuable, but must be justified by reference to nonlegal values. In
short, the upshot is that the law-politics distinction is thoroughly political in character and
ambition.29
When analysis is pushed beyond the simple invocation of the easy/hard case distinction,
its political nature is plain. Within the doctrinal and juristic materials, a hard case is one in
which the application of precedent leads to a conclusion that is unacceptable because, for
example, it is out of step with conventional views of justice. This means that the easy case
is one in which the conclusion is acceptable. It follows, therefore, that easy cases are not
decided by purely doctrinal prompting, but merely couched in doctrinal language: it is
prevailing ideas of "acceptability" that decide the case. Consequently, while it is true that
most cases are easy, it is not because existing rules dispose of them, but because their
disposition by the rules is considered to be acceptable.JO In effect, all cases are hard in the
sense that they demand, no matter how unreflective or taken for granted, an initial appeal to
extra-doctrinal considerations of acceptability. Easy cases are one kind of hard case, and any
~fence of adjudicatory autonomy premised on their independence is destined to fail.
'J9 The third common misunderstanding is that critics hold that "decision-making is pure
result-selection followed by rationalization."31 This view posits the suggestion that judges
are consciously manipulative ideologues who combine in a Machiavellian manner with their
colleagues to implement a clear and self-serving scheme of social (in)justice. To associate
critics with such a crude view of human decision making and motivation is to ignore their
sophisticated articulation of the operation oflegaJ ideology. The ascription ofsuch judgmental
self-consciousness to individual actors is a feature of the very political philosophy that the
critics are most at pains to discredit and dislodge. The whole critical enterprise is devoted to
abandoning the dichotomous view that law is either the reflection of a pure reason or the
exercise of pure power. Instead, it contends that reason and power are inseparable: each
informs and provides the context for the other.
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To be plausible, any critical theory of adjudication must be able to account for the judges'
felt boundedness. It cannot discard the actual experience that decision makers have of being
compelled by doctrine to reach particular results. Nevertheless, this existential fact does not
require a denial of ideology. Its most important function is to offer a framework for
formulating a personal identity and self-understanding, including the idea that we are
independent operatives in the social world. Legal consciousness operates so effectively
precisely because it persuades the "rulers" as well as the "ruled" that the judicial function is
a constrained and impersonal exercise of official authority. It is as fl awed to propose that the
lawyer is everything as much as it is to suggest that the law is everything. Although there are
instances of overt manipulation, legal doctrine amounts to more than the residual traces of
the judicial mind's unbounded free-play. The posited distinction between "that to be
interpreted" (doctrine) and " that which interprets" cannot be sustained.32 Neither doctrine
nor lawyer exclusively controls meaning. Each is implicated by and in the other. Both
doctrine and lawyer are shaped by their political milieu; they interact and interpenetrate to
generate legal discourse and its reality. Judgment and values are neither the objective
essences of an intelligible world nor the subjective fantasies of a chaotic existence. They are
the contingent effect of varied and overlapping economiesofintellectual, social, and political
thought.

IV
The proof of any theoretical pudding is in the eating. This is as true for the critics' position
as it is for that of the traditionalists. The major argument that must be defended is that law
is different from politics in that the application oflegal reasoning to particular problems will
make an appreciable difference to their resolution. If these cases had been left to the ebb and
flow of ideological exchanges, the autonomists' argument must be that the outcome would
be different. Of course, it is not necessary for it to be shown that the result will be different
in every case, only that there would be a difference in a statistically significant number of
cases. Also, the autonomists must be able to demonstrate that this difference is attributable
to a reliance upon legal reasoning and not traceable to the political preference of the legal
reasoner. In short, the law per se must make a difference.
For the traditional claim to pull any epistemological weight, its proponents must show
that law is a rational discipline and not merely a convenient battery of technical rationalizations.
Doctrinal justification must be more than conventional apparel for naked political preference.
Furthermore, the demonstration that any particular decision is wrong or errant will not be
enough in itself to support their arguments. Those who believe in law's determinacy must
presumably accept a difference between being a bad judge and not being a judge at all. Rather
than concentrate on the identifying criteria of legitimate legal reasoning, it can be more
instructive to put the usual questions in a slightly different way - what might not amount
to a legal analysis of the facts and the doctrinal matters in a particular dispute? And what might
not count as a judicial resolution of them?
In order to substantiate these criticisms and to join substantive issue with traditional
scholars, I will d iscuss the case of Miller v. Jackson.33 It deals with the vexed issue of"coming
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to the nuisance" -that is, whether it is a defence to an otherwise successful action in nuisance
that the offending state of affairs existed prior to or at the time of the plaintiff's acquisition
of land. Although it is generally agreed that this is not a defence, there still thrives a vibrant
debate about its precise scope and application and meaning,34 After summarizing the facts
and decision, I will critique one particular traditional account of the rule - Posner's - and
offer my own "critical" reading of the judgments. The aim is not to show that there is no rule,
nor that there is no better or worse result in specific circumstances, but to establish that the
doctrine does not of itself preclude or require any particular outcome and that no one result
is uniquely preferable to any other.
The Millers lived on a housing estate that was recently built by a cricket ground where
cricket had been played for about 70 years. As a result of their complaints, the club erected
a high fence to prevent balls invading their garden. This proved to be no real deterrent and
according to the Millers, the situation became so intolerable that they felt obliged to vacate
their home whenever a game was played. Finally, they applied to the court for an injunction
to restrain the playing ofcricket. The club conceded that, while cricket was played, there was
no foolproof way of stopping cricket balls going into the Millers' garden. However, the club
denied that its activities amount to an unreasonable interference with the Millers' enjoyment
of their property. Moreover, it insisted that it had taken all reasonable measures to protect the
Millers.
Although the Millers were successful at first instance, the Court of Appeal upheld their
claim for damages, but refused to g rant an injunction against the playing of cricket. In
reaching this decision, the reasoning of the judges is all over the doctrinal map. Lord Denning
M.R. concluded that there was no negligence and no nuisance. As the club had offered to pay
$800 for past and futu re damages, he ordered the payment to the Millers of that amount. At
the other extreme, Geoffrey Lane L.J. held that there was both negligence and nuisance and
that an injunction should be granted. As a consoling gesture to the club, he postponed its
issuance for 12 months in order to allow for the location of a new ground. Finally, CummingBruce L.J. occupied a middle position and determined that there was both negligence and
nuisance. However, he refused to grant an injunction and awarded damages of $800.
Accordingly, while the Millers won their action and recovered $800 in damages, cricket was
s till played and balls continued to pepper their garden.
The fact that the judges' reasoning and conclusions are so evidently at odds with one
a nother confirms little. But it does offer a rich set of textual materials with which to work.
While some might want to criticize a particular judgment as unsound or impolitic, it is
difficult to suggest that any of the three judgments does not amount to legal reasoning or
cannot be justified in terms of the existing doctrinal materials. Legitimacy or validity is not
the issue; rather, it is one of wisdom and cogency. Yet, when each judg ment can claim to be
a plausible performance of the j udicial craft, it renders somewhat transparent the assertion
that law is a constrained mode of decision making. Of course, it could be contended that, if
one of the judges explicitly and exclusively decided the case on the basis that the playing of
cricket should be promoted ahead ofall other activity, he or she would not be acting judicially.
Instead, they would be deciding in line with their own personal values and preferences.
However, at best, this merely shows that a decision that is not couched in the language of the
law does not deserve the label "legal." This is not a particularly devastating charge or
interesting revelation. 35 For it to be so, it would have to be demonstrated that the decision was
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not motivated by "nonlegal" considerations and then framed in the conventional rhetoric of
legal argumentation. It is surely the case that the demagogue does not become a democrat
because she dresses like one. Rationalization is not reasoning.
The critic would clearly be wrong to argue that it is not the generally stated rule that
"coming to the nuisance is no defence to nuisance." But this does not dispense with the
indeterminacy claim, it simply offers a site at which to locate and begin the deconstructive
excavation. Indeed, Posner's discussion of the rule and his implicit acceptance of its
uncontroversiality establish the ground for such an opportunity. While it is easy to state the
existence of the rule, it is much more difficult to explain its meaning and scope. Posner's own
illustrations of the problems with applying the rule in djfferent fact situations undermine
rather than reinforce his autonomist commitments. He provides clear confirmation of the
critics' major claims: that there is a large gap between general rule and particular result; that
the gap can only be filled with extra-legal considerations; and that these considerations will
be the dete1minative factor in any decision. All in all, his arguments give modem emphasis
to the traditional sentiment that the law of nuisance "is immersed in undefined uncertainty. "36
Posner approves of the "no defence" rule not because it is simply the law, but because
it is defensible as a matter of sound economic policy. When interpreted as placing liability
on the party who could have avoided competing resource uses at the least cost, it enhances
the maximization of wealth by ensuring that patterns of resource use are not "frozen" and that
the possibility of changing use is reflected in the investment decisions of land developers.37
Nevertheless, Posner cautions that "rejecting coming to the nuisance is the efficient rule
provided costs are calculated on the correct ex ante basis. "38 For example, where a longestablished polluting factory is gradually engulfed by encroaching suburban developments,
the relevant balancing is not between the relative moving costs of the factory and the
suburbanites, but is between the moving costs of the factory and the cost at which the
suburbanites could have initially located elsewhere.
Of course, the outcome of this balancing will depend upon the particular costs in each
case. In the example Posner uses, because the factory's costs are less than those of the
suburbanites, the result is that there is no nuisance and the factory can continue its operation
(and polluting). This seems that, in those particular circumstances, coming to the nuisance
is a very real and effective defence. This is a flat contradiction of Posner's support for the
common law's rejection of the defence. Posner compounds this dissemblance in this
discussion of the familiar Spur Industries case, in which the court held the defendant's
activities to be a nuisance, but ordered the plaintiff to pay the defendant's moving costs.39
He supports this "ingenious" decision on the basis that it "creates an incentive for the party
coming second . .. to go elsewhere instead if its costs of locating elsewhere, prior to its
locating next to the nuisance, would be lower than the cost to the defendant of moving."40
This is an express negation of the common law rule and a demonstration of its indeterminacy,
not an account of its determinate explication and application.
Nevertheless, although Posner manages to reject the general rule in the course of his
professed support for it, it could be contended that the economic rule of"least-cost avoider"
is sufficiently determinate to deflect such criticisms. This response fails for at least two
reasons. First, the deeper and more ideological difficulty is that any calculation of allocative
efficiency is always dependent upon contestable and, therefore, indeterminate assumptions
about the prior distribution of resources. The value of any particular resource is inextricably
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linked to whether or not a person already possesses it and what other resources they might
already possess.41 Second, the "least·costavoider" rule is open to exactly the same objections
as the "no defence" rule. The major stumbling block is the notorious difficulty of isolating
and quantifying the relevant costs with the necessary degree ofconfidence and precision. Not
only will much depend on the level of transaction costs, but the respective costs of the parties
are so detailed and so interdependent that their calculation is always speculative and
hypothetical- Who are the relevant parties? Is it the plaintiff, the suburbanites at large, or
the developer? What amounts to a cost? Who or what decides cost in a particular case? When
is valuation to occur? In short, general theoretical plausibility is confounded by specific
factual malleability. As Judge Posner has remarked, "the exactness which economic analysis
rigorously pursued ~ppears to offer is, at least in the litigation setting, somewhat delusive. "42
All these observations on Posner's analysis can be brought together in considering his
likely response to the Miller case. By his lights, anything is possible and all bets are on. The
looseness of his "least·cost avoider" interpretation guarantees that any outcome can be
justified and supported- the continuance ofcricket; the continuance ofcricket with payment
of damages; the prohibition of cricket; and the prohibition of cricket with compensation for
relocation. The crunch question is what costs are to be included in the social calculus. It is
surely the case that the economic variables can be selected and quantified to ensure very
different computations of the economically optimal result. Indeed, more to the point, there
is no technical or objective way in which to assign or formulate such costs. Some values will
be overlooked, while others will receive disproportionate attention.43 Is it the costs of the
Millers that are to be tabulated? Or is it the initial relocation costs of the developer of the
residential estate that should be assessed? What about those neighbours who view the
proximity of the cricket club as a benefit? Is the valuation to be based on general market
prices? Or is it the Millers' idiosyncratic costing that should prevail? Do the club's costs
include the inconvenience to the players, spectators, and their opponents? How is such
disappointment to be quantified? Is tradition or local culture to count at all?
Once the "appropriate" costing and calculation has been made, the decision would
presumably be written up by Posner in his favoured style of judicial reasoning. Moreover,
whatever outcome is arrived at, the decision will simply be a card to be played in the
continuing game of bargaining and behaviour modification. The law will not be the arbiter
of the dispute, but will only be a factor in the workings of the market. In theory, for instance,
the club could "buy out" any injunction awarded to the Millers or the Millers could "bribe"
the club to continue their cricket elsewhere. This raises another thorny problem of valuation,
namely, wealth effects. Is the relevant figure the amount the Millers would be willing to pay
to the club to stop the cricket or is it the amount the Millers would be willing to accept from
the club to permit the cricket? In answering these riddles, the so·called traditional virtues of
doctrinal predictability, determinacy, and integrity are ransomed to the cause of a spurious
and crude political instrumentalism. The law becomes the agent of the market rather than its
principal and legal theory becomes the tool of the marketeer.
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This critique of Posner can be generalized and tied to a broader theory of legal interpretation.
I shall call this "deconstruction."44 Although it has come to be used as a general catch-all for
any unconventional criticism of law and legal theory, it is a very subversive and profound
form of philosophical critique. Its target is the whole edifice of western metaphysics. In
jurisprudential terms, the ambition is to show that law and legal doctrine are not and cannot
be informed by an overarching rationality. It is not that legal doctrine is irrational,
nonrational, or meaningless, nor that it is any more or less rational than any other mode of
thought or reasoning. On the contrary, deconstruction shows that law is of a piece with other
forms of social knowledge. There is no rationality, but there are many rationalities and all are
as historically conditioned, politically specific, and socially constructed as each other.
Deconstruction is not a philosophy, but a theoretical strategy for displacing traditional
philosophy, especially its insistence upon the existence of a stable foundation for truth and
knowledge. However, for the deconstructionist, referentiality and meaning are not so much
nonexistent as profoundly problematic. The attempt to demonstrate and defend any theory
of embodied meaning is ruthlessly revealed as leading into a black hole of historical
deferment. No interpretation is right or wrong and no mode of linguistic signification can
achieve interpretive hegemony. It is not that deconstruction erases meaning or denies
intentionality, but that it perpetually postpones and decentres them and thus deprives them
of any privileged or original authority. It foils any orderly attempt to progress to knowledge
or recover meaning by denying that there can ever be philosophical closure to the vertiginous
attempts at historical appropriation. Nonetheless, deconstruction is not randomly or wantonly
destructive. It takes the object of its critique and, working to collapse it from within,
deconstructs the constructs of philosophy to better reveal their constructedness.
To understand and control the world, traditional thinking employs a set of enabling
djstinctions that are treated as natural and obvious, such as objective/subjective, reason/
emotion, or mind/body. This means that any coherent and cogent account of fixed meaning
and grounded knowledge must not only explain the precise and stable relation between these
oppositions, but also find a way of talking about them that is itself precise and stable. It claims
to do this by privileging one over the other and granting epistemological authority to it. In
contrast, deconstruction goes behind these hierarchical dichotomies and shows that they have
a history and are far from natural or obvious. Operating from inside the traditional paradigm,
deconstruction unravels and lays bare the contradictory, inescapable, and warring forces that
both constitute and confound the common sense meaning of words and texts. A good example
of this is the historically constructed and contexted distinction of male/female, which is used
to justify a whole set of conceptual and social practices.
Moreover, these duplicitous dualities of consciousness cannot be sustained. The
unprivileged "other" disrupts and undennines its privileged partner. While it is a necessary
contra_st to it, it is also a contradiction of it. So interrelated are they that the one not only makes
the other possible, but contributes to its negation: "neither/nor, that is, simultaneously either
or."45 In short, what is excluded is implicated in and is essential to what is included:
philosophy depends on the very history that it is at pains to deny. The metaphysical dream
of providing a solid foundation for truth and know ledge is doomed to failure by its own lights.
Importantly, however, the deconstructive technique is not intended simply to reverse the
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hierarchical order and place-for instance, community over individual or woman over man
in terms of epistemological authority. It is to be understood as rejecting entirely the
dichotomous and passive mode of thinking about the world, in favour of a more engaged and
active way of truth-making.
The three judgments in Miller offer a rich textual diet on which the hungry critic can
feast.46 In particular, Denning's judgment is an opportunity par excellence for the
deconstructionists to show their analytical stuff. It is a textbook example of the flipability of
supposedly opposite categorizations and the arbitrary priorization ofone term over the other.
The deconstructive challenge is to describe the process by which this occurs and the interests
that it serves. As such, critique is a simple laying bare of contradiction's insidious existence
at the heart of doctrinal being. Denning's efforts to negotiate the public/private distinction
set the stage perfectly for such a description:
[l]t is our task to balance the right of the cricket club to continue playing cricket ... as against the
right of the householder not to be interfered with .... There is a contest here between the interest
of the public at large and the interest of a private individual. The public interest lies in protecting
the environment by preserving our playing fields in the face of mounting development, and by
enabling our youth to enjoy all the benefits of outdoor games, such as cricket and football. The
private interest lies in securing the privacy of his home and garden without intrusion or
interference by anyone .... As between their conflicting interest, I am of the opinion that the public
interest should prevail over the private interest (981-82)47

It takes little imagination to realize that Denning's pouring of social wine into the
.::onceptual bottles of public and private interests can be of a very different kind. The playing
of cricket can be as "private" a matter as sitting out in the sun and the security of people's
homes can be as "public" a matter as the preservation of playing fields. Although the
flipability of Denning's characterization is plain and simple in Miller, it is possible to make
such a switch in all situations. In short, the raw materials of life do not present themselves to
policymakers as always and already divided into natural categories of social interest. The
world is not given, but is constantly being made and re-made. Seeds of fact reap a rich harvest
of values only when cultivated by ideological gardeners. Denning's depiction of the
contestants is a prescriptive act of creation rather than a descriptive report of detachment.
Having established the competing interests and assigned the litigants to their respective
sides of the balancing scales, Denning proceeds to place his thumb on the side of public
interest. In such contests, he seems to assume that it is axiomatic that "the public interest
should prevail over the private interest" (982). The whole judgment is given over to
establishing a rhetorical climate in which the prevalence of the public interest seems obvious
and natural. Yet Denning offers no argument as to why this conclusion should be treated as
self-evident. Indeed, he begs the very question that this analysis is supposedly directed
toward answering - when and why does the public interest prevail over private interest?
When it comes to the decisional crunch, the Master of the Rolls hides behind declaratory
platitudes, like "[o]n taking the balance, I would ... " and "[a]s between their conflicting
interest, I am of the opinion ... " (981 and 982), and elides any explanatory reasoning. His
judgment draws its appeal and cogency, ifany, from his efforts to tap the political sensibilities
and sympathies of its intended audience than from the logical rigour of its doctrinal analysis.
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The style and phrasing of Denning' s offering is structured by the contradictory impulses
of "progress" and "tradition." Although his judgment is voiced predominantly in the accent
of a progressive preference for calculations of public interest in matters of competing land
use, there is a more subtle idiom of traditional rhetoric that runs alongside and is often
intertwined with the more dominant tone. At the same time that he refuses "to approach this
case with the eyes of the judges of the 19th century" and insists that " it should be approached
on principles applicable to modern conditions" (978 and 981 ), he is adamant that temporal
priority is deserving oflegal precedence. He frequently and pejoratively contrasts the cricket
club's long-standing contribution to the community to the Millers' status as "newcomers"
(976 and 981). In this consummate exercise in judicial craft, Denning manages to couch a
defence of vested property rights in the language of social progress. For all his rhetorical
support for progress and public interest, the driving force of the decision is the conservative
desire to preserve the status quo: "I would agree [with Lord Reid' s dictum that 'if cricket
cannot be played on a ground without creating a substantial risk, then it should not be played
there at all'] if the houses or road was there first and the cricket ground came there second"
(977).48 Of course, to reach the same result, Denning could have run a more straightforward
traditional defence of vested interests, but this would have robbed the decision of much of
its success as a rhetorical exemplar.
Cumming-Bruce and Geoffrey Lane take a different tack to Denning, but still manage
to ground themselves on the shoals of contradiction. The particular dilemma that they
perceive, and from which they seek to escape, is that between precedent and equity or, in
grander terms, between positive law and natural law. It is a m anifestation of the tension
between the desire for stability and certainty and the simultaneous urge for flexibility and
maneuverability. At the heart of this dilemma is the acceptance that justice demands, as an
institutional matter, both the general embrace of rule-driven adjudication and the occasional
departure from it; "the rules transcend the case as immediately experienced, the insight is
immanent in it."49 The challenge for judges is to decide in which particular circumstances
the general rules are to be observed or overlooked. The traditional response by which to
contain and mediate this contradiction has been the regular, but unconvincing resort to
"discretion."
For both Cumming-B111ce and Geoffrey Lane, their personal sympathies lay with the
cricket club, whose officials they found to be "candid and forthright" (984), rather than with
Mrs. Miller, whom they thought verged on the "neurotic" and "obsessive" (983 and 989).
However, they both also agreed that existing doctrine seemed to mandate a result in the
Millers' favour. This presented them with the classic contest between the pull of precedent
and the lure of justice. F or Geoffrey Lane's part, h e opts to follow the rules laid down. B ut,
in doing this, he does not act against justice, but in the name of justice. He collapses the
distinction between law and equity by assuming that justice requires strict obedience to the
results of rule application:
Precedent apart, justice would seem to demand that the plaintiffs should be left to make the most
of the site they have elected to occupy with all its obvious advantages and equally obvious
disadvantages .... If the matter were res integra, I confess I should be inclined to find for the
defendants .... Unfortunately, however, the question is not open .... It may be that [the rule in
Sturges v. Bridgman] works injustice, it may be that one would decide the matter differently in the
absence of authority. But we are bound by [that] decision ... and it is not for this court as I see it
to alter a rule which has stood for so long. (986-87)
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Whereas Geoffrey Lane arbitrarily conflates law and equity, Cumming-Bruce arbitrarily
separates them. He seeks to demonstrate that discretion can be used to temper the rule without
swallowing the rule. It is a matter of equity being ordered by the law and discretion being
required by the rules. While justice requires that rules are followed, the rules sanction the
resort to discretion. It is an implicit attempt to instruct Geoffrey Lane in the possibilities of
legal doctrine and judicial craft. Agreeing with Geoffrey Lane on "his reasoning and
conclusion upon the liability of the defendants" (987), Cumming-Bruce relies upon the
distinction between liability and remedy to escape the dilemma of contradiction:
There is authority that, in considering whether to exercise a judicial discretion to grant an
injunction, the court is under a duty to consider the interests of the public .... So on the facts of
this case a court of equity must seek to strike a fair balance between the right of the plaintiffs to
have quiet enjoyment of their house ... and the opportunity of the inhabitants of the village .. . to
enjoy ... a summer recreation .... It is relevant circumstance which a court of equity should take
into account that the plaintiffs decided to buy a house which .. . was obviously on the boundary
of a quite small cricket ground .... There are here special circumstances which should inhibit a
court of equity from granting the injunction claimed. (988-89)

This deconstructive reading of Miller hopefully shows that legal doctrine is another
combat zone over the terms and arrangements of social life. With varying degrees of
sophistication, the three judges engage in a rhetorical exercise that is intended to persuade
people (and themselves) that law possesses an autonomy from the open-ended encounters of
overt ideological confrontation. In contrast, the responsibility of the critic is to counteract
these attempts to depoliticize and dehistoricize the judicial development of doctrine. By
reinstalling politics and history into the legal enterprise, people might come to see that the
determination of legal meaning involves an inevitable taking of sides. Law is neither separate
nor separable from disputes about the kind of world there is and can be. Law is the historical
residue of one kind of political struggle.

VI
Nietzsche's apocalyptic announcement that "God is dead" echoed a truth that had been long
grasped by most lawyers. The belief that law represented God's design never held much
sway. It was conceded that law was a human artifact. It could never amount to much more
(and was often much less) than a flawed distillation ofdivine wisdom. However, despite this
traditional acknowledgment and modern protestations to the contrary, the enclaves of law
remain "caves, for ages yet, in which His shadow will be shown."50 Instead of dwelling on
God's loss, jurists must rest content with "voicing the dictates of a vague divinity";51 these
pseudo-theological musings usually come veiled in the trappings of philosophy and economics.
While lawyerliness might no longer be next to godliness, dreams of hubris still fire the
jurisprudential imagination. Abstract reflection is given priority over experiential engagement. Detached reason remains the touchstone for valid knowledge about ourselves, our
situation, and the legal order. In the struggle for social justice, philosophy and science are
preferred to democracy. As law is cast as an exercise in reason, lawyers are fated to become
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philosophers or social scientists if law is to perfect itself and operate as a guide for the
anguished democrat.
Yet, with a recognition that reason and power are connected, this self-image of the
lawyer or legal theorist as a trader in eternal verities must be abandoned. As the high priests
of traditional theorizing, Posner and his ilk must be defrocked. Indeed, the whole theoretical
endeavour will have to undergo a radical reappraisal and reorientation. Philosophy (of law)
must cease to be a task of refined description and defined prescription; it must become a
political project of deconstruction and reconstruction. The whole agenda of questions to be
answered-What is law? How is it different from politics?-is in need.of redrafting. Loaded
questions engender loaded answers. Those particular questions assume that law is indeed
different and the jurist's primary task is to explain how it is different. Archibald MacLeish
had the measure of contemporary scho]arsh ip: "we have learned the answers, all the answers;
it is the question that we do not know."52 The answers that Posner and the autonomists
propose cannot be rejected out of hand. But they can be stripped of their false objectivity and
treated as one more series of proposals to be debated and considered in the popular assembly
of democratic politics. As such, an explanation of the law's indeterminacy does not hasten
the demise of democracy, as many traditional writ~rs seem to predict. This is merely a scare
tactic designed to underwrite and warrant their own tenuous power. The indeterminacy
critique is fatal to the legitimacy of the adjudicative enterprise, but it is not damaging to
democracy. While indeterminacy jeopardizes any mode ofobjective decision making, it does
offer an understanding of how ordinary citizens· can and must be entrusted with increased
responsibility and authority in the name of democratic empowerment.
To traffic in philosophical disillusionment is not to indulge in a cheerless cynicism. It
is neither nihilistic nor irresponsible. By encouraging people to understand themselves as the
makers of decisions and not as the amanuenses of a received wisdom, they will begin to
assume great responsibility for those decisions' consequences and the ensuing society will
become truly theirs. In this way, people will grasp that democracy is not about servitude to
philosophical tyrants, interpretive Popes or legal emperors,53 but is about personal participation and social solidarity. In a world ofincorrigible indeterminacy, the sane response is not
despair or defeat. It is the bold acceptance that decision making is no more mysterious and
no less complex than the rest of life. People must think, decide and act in the same way in law
as they aspire to do in the rest of their lives- through concrete and constitutive conversations
in which the participants speak and listen in a shared commitment to mutual enlightenment
and continuing respect for the conversation's own ethical dynamic.54 This recognition and
aspiration will mean that democratic practice will have to be given priority over legalistic
values. The devaluation of the Rule of Law, in a society in which it has come to signify rule
by lawyers, is not an occasion to be lamented.
Within such democratic communities, intelligible action is not an extended genuflection
to the revealed truth of Reason or Economic Efficiency, but is a situated act of constructive
cooperation among ourselves. In all matters, decision making will be more than "the
deliverance of a Reason so immanent that its own name is the only explanatory word it can
utter."55 There will be a general sensitivity to the fact that rationality is less a guide or limiting
condition for individual action and more an achievement and elaboration of social engagement.
Within such an enlightened conte~t, indeterminacy will not engender efforts to gloss over or
theorize it away. It will be attended to in a spirit of collective humility. While there is no relief

Crits and Cricket

201

or escape from taking responsibility for life's always difficult and often painful decisions,
there is a sustaining satisfaction in people facing and resolving them for themselves.
Although it will be no less heated and contested, public policy-making can become a
treasured creation of people's own craft and not the glossy product of legal chicanery. The
appropriation of political discourse by a legal elite offends and inhibits the aspiration to
progressive or egalitarian governance. In short, social justice will be brought about in spite
of, not because of, lawyers.
In Miller, although all three judges mentioned it in passing, there was an overlooked
democratic solution to the problem. An informed and electorally-accountable body had
already considered the issue. Lord Denning mentioned the matter of planning approval, but
only to dismiss it as misguided:
I must say that I am surprised that the developers of that housing estate were allowed to build the
houses so close to the cricket ground. No doubt they wanted to make the most of their site and put
up as many houses as they could for their own profit. The planning authorities ought not to have
allowed it. The houses ought to have been so sited as not to interfere with the cricket. But the houses
have been built and we have to contend with the consequences .... [The cricket club) have spent
money, labour and love in the making of [the cricket ground]; and they have the right to play on
it as they have done for seventy years. Is this all to be rendered useless to them by the thoughtless
and selfish act of an estate developer in building right up to the edge of it? (976 and 978)

Without speaking to the procedural niceties or substantive merits, it can be assumed that
the development was neither entirely "thoughtless" nor "selfish." Before the developers
could proceed, they had to obtain planning permission. This would have had to be granted
in accordance with established regulations, formulated policies and required procedures. By
ignoring this fact, the court substituted its own decision for that of the planning authorities'.
Moreover, it did so without troubling to apprise itself of the details or reasoning of the
planning authorities. However, the point is not who made the "correct" or "right" decision;
it is which is the most appropriate body, in terms of institutional competence and democratic

legitimacy, to do the necessary balancing and compromising of competing interest. On both
counts, a less-than-ideal municipal board is preferable to an ideal-as-possible judicial bench.
In a democratic society, law will be another institutional site where the same contradictory
impulses that constitute and challenge our individual selves can be openly addressed. And,
as in our personal lives, any accommodation achieved in the response to indeterminacy will
need to be self-conscious, tentative, and revisable. No signposts on life's journey will be
found that are not of our own making. A realization might dawn that it is only possible to
illuminate the way into the historical dark of the future by the clarity of our joint commitment
and engagement. Rather than sight and pursue an imaginary light at the end of the historical
tunnel-it will only be some philosopher's torch or economist's lantern anyway - we must
look to each other. There is no shirking that responsibility. Domination and thraldom are all
that can be hoped for when it is believed that theological relief is close at hand. The
transcendental search will have to give way to the quest for greater participatory democracy.
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QUESTIONS

1. Is Critical Legal Studies just a fancy version ofMarxism, or does it offer a different analysis
of law? Jn particular, how does each approach deal with postmodemism? Can you identify
the key elements of the postmodern perspective? Does postmodemism itself undercut the
critical analysis?
2. Is there anything about law, legal met~odologies, or ways of legal thinking that remains
sacred in the eyes of the crit? Is the crit just a trasher? If everything is politics, are we not
irretrievably forced back into a Hobbesian state of nature, where life is "solitary, poor, nasty,
brutish, and short"?
3. Does Hutchinson articulate a convincing alternative, democratic theory of law?
4. Which is the more persuasive analysis of to1t law: Weinrib's self-proclaimed, apolitical,
corrective justice approach, or Hutchinson's unabashedly political polemic? Which approach
will better serve Canadian society? Is there such a thing as "Canadian society," or is that just
a falsely constructed, pre-modern politico-juridicial edifice?
5. Is anything beyond the realm of "politics"? Reconsider this question in the light of the
feminist essays in this book.
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